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Taxpayers often view tax rules and filing processes as complicated. In this paper
I study whether the perceived tax uncertainty among peers leads to a reduction
of voluntary tax compliance. I find strong supportive evidence for this hypothesis
using a survey experiment for a large representative sample of the German pop-
ulation. Providing randomized information that others are uncertain about how
to file their taxable income decreases individual tax morale. This suggests that
subjects use negative peer signals as an excuse in order to opt-out of tax compli-
ance. Studying related heterogeneous treatment effects, I find that both older and
left-wing subjects are more responsive to tax uncertainty of others. I also show
persistent treatment effects among very honest taxpayers in a follow-up survey.
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1 Introduction
Many taxpayers regularly face the task of filing their annual tax declaration, which re-
quires processing large amounts of information and abiding ample documentation re-
quirements. This is all the more cumbersome for taxpayers since modern tax systems are
typically complex and involve many tax rules, which are often updated on a yearly basis.
Therefore, it may not come as a surprise that existing work finds that people frequently
have a poor knowledge on existing tax rules and their implications (Stantcheva, 2020).1
According to a recent representative survey, people perceive tax filing to be very or rather
difficult and about 90% support a move towards simpler tax rules (Blesse et al., 2021).
Complex tax schedules and filing processes also have important negative implications
such as low-take of rates of tax benefits (e.g. Chetty et al. (2013) and Bhargava and
Manoli (2015)), large compliance costs on taxpayers (Benzarti, 2020), inattention to new
tax incentives (Abeler and Jaeger, 2015) and the fact that taxpayers are confused and
misinterpret economic incentives of taxes (Feldman et al., 2016; Aghion et al., 2017).2
Against this background, complex tax rules may reduce compliance and enforce-
ment levels (Krause, 2000). Notably, Bellemare et al. (2019) show lab evidence that
people use the ambiguity from unintentional filing mistakes in complex tax settings as
an excuse for non-compliance. This shows that complex tax rules have a negative direct
effect on tax compliance by creating tax payer confusion and opening up wiggle room for
individuals to opt-out of compliance. However, even though people also make individual
tax compliance decisions in a social context (e.g. Traxler (2010) and Frey and Torgler
(2007)), it remains unclear whether there may be indirect negative effects (or spillovers)
of observing other taxpayers to be confused. Specifically, taxpayer may use signals about
the filing uncertainty of others as an excuse for not paying taxes themselves.3 In a world
where it is the norm rather than the exception to be uncertain about how to file one’s
taxes, these negative peer signals may decrease the morale costs of tax non-compliance.
This paper addresses this question and provides causal evidence on spillover effects
of peer information about tax confusion of others on own tax compliance. Specifically,
1People seem to systematically underestimate average tax rates (De Bartolome, 1995; Gideon, 2017;
Ballard and Gupta, 2018). This may be due to confusion about the concepts of average and marginal
tax rates as well as non-linearities in tax schedules. Rees-Jones and Taubinsky (2020) provide experi-
mental evidence that people regularly engage in heuristics to approximate non-linear tax schedules (i.e.
”Schmeduling”, as discussed by Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004)). Stantcheva (2020) and Aghion et al.
(2017) show that people do not correctly understand income tax schedules. Hoopes et al. (2015) report
that taxpayers are often not fully informed about taxes but search for relevant information when the tax
becomes more salient. Chetty et al. (2009) highlight the role of tax salience for economic behavior.
2For a recent review of the economic implications of tax complexity, please see Blesse et al. (2021).
3On a related note, Bursztyn et al. (2020) find evidence that people use justifications for adopting
socially stigmatized behavior and judge others who use such excuses for stigmatized behavior less harshly.
In my specific setting, people may use tax difficulties of other taxpayers as a justification for decreasing
pro-social behavior of compliance and to engage in social stigmatized behavior of non-compliance. Thus,
signals of taxpayer uncertainty from others should decrease the motivation to pay taxes by oneself.
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I show whether information about the perceived uncertainty of others how to file taxes
reduces individual tax morale.4 In order to do this, I designed a survey experiment which
asked participants about their tax morale, i.e. their view on the justifiability of tax
evasion, and compared the their answers across three experimental groups which differ in
the amount of information about taxpayer uncertainty of others. The analysis is inspired
by a recent representative survey among the general population in Germany from Blesse
et al. (2021) which finds that half of survey respondents find their tax declaration difficult
and especially see the chance of forgetting something or reporting falsely as the source
of these difficulties (Blesse et al., 2021, p. 56). This observation may be used as a
justification for opting-out of tax compliance and judge tax evasion less harshly. The act
of tax evasion or even support for evasion likely comes with a social stigma in the eyes
of the general population since survey-data shows consistently high tax morale among
the German population (see Section 2.1). Thus, signals of taxpayer uncertainty among
others should decrease the motivation to pay taxes and improve views on the justification
of tax evasion. To put it differently, becoming aware of people not being able to declare
their taxes properly may reduce the moral cost of evasion and therefore, people may be
more accepting of non-compliance.
The survey experiment was fielded in the German Internet Panel (GIP) which is a
large probability-based sample of the general population in Germany.5 The survey has 3
experimental groups to study the role of taxpayer uncertainty of others for tax morale.
First, the Uncertainty condition gives respondents the information about prevalent
difficulties of others when filing their annual tax declaration, which is inspired from a
previous survey of the author (see Blesse et al. (2021)). Specifically, the information
states that in the context of complex tax laws (due to many deduction and exemption
possibilities) many citizens are often not sure about whether they report all incomes
correctly in their tax declaration. Respondents in this treatment should be more aware
of other taxpayers’ lack of tax knowledge and their uncertainty on how to file their taxable
income properly. This treatment condition thus allows me to test whether people are more
lenient towards tax evasion when becoming aware of other taxpayer’s uncertainty about
how to file their taxes. Individuals may adopt the view that non-compliance may be due
to ’honest’ mistakes in light of prevalent tax uncertainties among others.
Second, the Unequal knowledge treatment augments the social information from
4I refer to tax morale as all non-pecuniary motives or one’s intrinsic motivation to pay taxes in line with
Luttmer and Singhal (2014) and Frey and Torgler (2007). Related contributions include Halla (2012),
Besley et al. (2019), Alm and Torgler (2006), Richardson (2006), Frey and Torgler (2007), Torgler (2005),
Wenzel (2004), Lewis (1982) and Alm et al. (1992). Notably, Dwenger et al. (2016) find tax compliance
even in the absence of enforcement, likely due to duty–to–comply preferences.
5Other research papers that use GIP data include, among others, Dörrenberg and Peichl (2018),
Kerschbamer and Müller (2020), Engelmann et al. (2018), Blesse et al. (2021), Blesse and Heinemann
(2020), Müller and Renes (2020), Gsottbauer et al. (2020) as well as Fehr et al. (2020).
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the Uncertainty group with the contrasting notion that there are also other citizens who
possess the relevant tax knowledge or have access to it through tax advisors and make
use of that knowledge in order to reduce their tax burden. Accordingly, this treatment
condition represents a framing of the uncertainty treatment insofar as it highlights the
fact that heterogeneous groups have different opportunities to optimize their after-tax
incomes. The augmented statement captures the existence of distinct coexisting tax-
subcultures which differ in their levels of tax compliance (Lewis, 1982; Traxler, 2010).
Accordingly, in this condition taxpayers should be perceived to differ in their compliance
rates due to different abilities to comply with complex taxes, and to influence their after-
tax income through tax knowledge. Third and last, a control group does not receive
any information. All three experimental groups, however, read the same neutral opening
statement about tax evasion in order to become familiarized with the topic.
The results show that informing respondents about the prevalent uncertainties of
others when reporting income for tax purposes significantly decreases elicited tax morale.
First, this shows that people are not necessarily aware of uncertainties of other taxpayers
in the context of filing tax declarations. This is true despite the fact that 50% of respon-
dents elicited in an earlier wave of the GIP that they find tax declarations somewhat
or very difficult (see Blesse et al. (2021)). Second, the significant negative effect of the
Uncertainty treatment shows that the respondents empathize with tax-filing problems of
others, making them more lenient towards tax evasion. The Unequal knowledge group
also significantly reduces elicited tax morale as compared to the control group but one
cannot reject the equality of effects between both treatments.
Moreover, I find that the negative information effect of both treatments results en-
tirely from a lower likelihood that respondents chose the answer category representing
the highest tax morale. Thus, information about uncertainties regarding tax filing due
to complex tax rules especially reduces the prevalence of very honest taxpayers. Related
effects are larger for the Uncertainty group. I also analyze whether certain groups of
participants respond more or less elastically to either of the treatment interventions with
respect to their tax morale. Given the longitudinal structure of the GIP survey, I can ex-
ploit rich background information on each respondent from previous survey waves. Older
respondents show stronger negative responses than younger subjects to the Uncertainty
information, i.e. that many people are uncertain how to properly declare their taxable
income.6 Regarding the Unequal knowledge condition, I find that the result of a lower
tax morale is dominantly driven by political ideology. Specifically, left-wing respondents
show significantly lower tax morale when being confronted with the augmented treatment
condition, as compared to conservative participants. This corresponds to the results of
6This corresponds with evidence that higher age groups show higher support for simpler taxes (see
Blesse et al. (2021)). Aghion et al. (2017) also report that older individuals know less about tax incentives
and are also less able to learn, indicating higher cognitive costs in adjusting to complex tax rules.
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Alesina et al. (2018) who find that political preferences play a large for redistributive
preferences. In line with their results, I argue that left-wing participants care more about
the uncertainty of ‘other’ taxpayers if this may result unequal opportunities of taxpayers
to optimize their after-tax income through differences in tax knowledge at their disposal.
Accordingly, leftists are more lenient towards tax evasion, likely as a means of redistri-
bution towards a disadvantaged group of tax filers who either lack tax knowledge or do
not have the means to access it through (presumably costly) advice.
I also test the persistence of my results using a follow-up survey in the GIP two
months after the main experiment. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt
to study within-person changes in tax morale over time. First, the elicited tax morale
appears to be relatively stable for individual respondents in the control group over time.
Second, the treatment effects do not appear to be persistent regarding their effect on
tax morale on average. Nonetheless, the share of very high tax morale is significantly
reduced by both types of information even two months after the intervention in the main
survey. Thus, peer information about tax uncertainty of others has persistent effects
on very honest levels of tax morale and the resulting changes in judgments of evasion
grow less strong and more lenient again over time. Persistent treatment effects, however,
also suggest that the estimated effects arise due to new information rather than due to
an increased salience of taxpayer confusion. Again, I find that political ideology is an
important driver of the negative treatment effect of the Unequal knowledge condition.
The point estimates are virtually identical with the respective effects in the main survey.
It appears that left-wing respondents internalized a more lenient view towards tax evasion
when being informed that taxpayer uncertainties are common and when possible negative
distributional implications for unaware taxpayers are highlighted to the participants.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, I add to the general
literature on tax compliance and in particular to work regarding the intrinsic motivation
of tax compliance (see Luttmer and Singhal (2014) for a recent review). The treatment
conditions both speak to papers addressing peer effects and social influences as a channel
of tax morale (for a review of the empirical evidence and theoretical work, see Luttmer
and Singhal (2014) and Hashimzade et al. (2013), respectively). Cross-country survey
evidence supports the hypothesis of ’conditional cooperation’ where people decide to com-
ply depending on the (perceived) compliance of others (Frey and Torgler, 2007). Several
randomized control trials (RCTs), however, provide a mixed picture whether informa-
tion provision regarding compliance behavior of others has an effect on individual tax
compliance. Some studies find positive effects of peer information on compliance behav-
ior, including Hallsworth et al. (2017) who study timely tax payment in the UK. The
authors highlight the value of descriptive over injunctive norms (“what others do” vs.
“what others think should be done”). Bott et al. (2020) also find improved compliance
of peer information among Norwegian taxpayers. Moreover, Del Carpio (2014) shows
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that informing taxpayers about average compliance has long-lasting positive effects but
information about enforcement levels does not. Notably, empirical support for the rele-
vance of social interactions in tax compliance also comes from studies showing spillovers
in tax compliance among peer networks (Drago et al. (2020) for the case of TV license
fees; Paetzold and Winner (2016) for reporting a commuter tax allowance). Other RCT
studies, however, do not find peer effects on average, such as Slemrod et al. (2001), Fellner
et al. (2013), Castro and Scartascini (2015) or Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018). Also
social image concerns may play a role for compliance decisions. Governments can exploit
these concerns in order to increase tax compliance through shaming (Perez-Truglia and
Troiano, 2018; Dwenger and Treber, 2018). Rewards for compliance, however, can also
backfire depending on the intrinsic motivation of taxpayers (Dwenger et al., 2016).
The present paper contributes to this literature by providing novel evidence on the
effect of a yet overlooked negative peer information on voluntary tax compliance, i.e. the
perceived taxpayer uncertainty of other taxpayers, using a large-scale survey experiment
among a representative population sample.7 My results suggest that once people become
aware of tax confusion among others, they significantly reduce their own tax morale.
Second, my results complement recent studies on the effects of tax complexity on
tax compliance. These studies find, for instance, that people underreact to new tax rules
in more complex tax settings in the lab (Abeler and Jaeger, 2015).8 Bellemare et al.
(2019) show evidence from a lab experiment that the effects of tax complexity on tax
compliance are intrinsically linked to distributive fairness. Complex taxes appear to bear
justification potential for selfish behavior resulting from the ambiguity of filing mistakes.9
7There are a few other survey experiments on tax morale. Dörrenberg and Peichl (2018) study the
role of social norms and reciprocity and Sjoberg et al. (2019) analyze the effect of anti-corruption efforts
as well as the opportunity for citizens to voice their public expenditure preferences to the government.
Ortega et al. (2016) estimate the effect of government performance on the tax compliance.
8Several RCTs also find that simplified communication of tax authorities improves tax compliance
(De Neve et al., 2021; Dwenger et al., 2016; Eerola et al., 2019). De Neve et al. (2021) find persistent but
diminishing effects of a simplified letter of the tax authorities on compliance. Moreover, simplification
appears more cost-effective than traditional enforcement mechanisms. Dwenger et al. (2016) also find
differential effects of simplified tax notifications with higher compliance for evaders and null effects for
compliers. Other papers also indicate that a lack of awareness and complex welfare eligibility criteria add
to low welfare benefit-take up rates (Kleven and Kopczuk, 2011) and simplified information provision
to eligible benefit recipients can reduce this problem (Chetty and Saez, 2013; Bhargava and Manoli,
2015). Complex taxes (or perceptions thereof) also have negative effects on survey-based tax compliance
(Richardson, 2006; Frey and Torgler, 2007; Torgler, 2005). Eriksen and Fallan (1996) also show that tax
knowledge improves tax morale and fairness perceptions of the tax system.
9Related to justification for selfish behavior is the behavioral concept of ’moral wiggle room’ (Dana
et al., 2007). Evidence of pro-social behavior may often come from the fact that people want to appear
fair but are, in fact, more selfish and inherently reluctant to share (e.g. Lazear et al. (2012)). In line
with this concept, participants in laboratory experiments opt-out of pro-social behavior when uncertainty
in the relation of choices and outcomes arise. I find evidence in a large-scale survey experiment on a
representative sample of the general population that the intrinsic motivation for the social norm of tax
compliance is not robust with respect to information about uncertainties of others from complex tax
systems and that people use this information as an opportunity to reduce their tax morale.
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However, none of these papers show whether the perceived tax confusion among others
(among others, established in Blesse et al. (2021)) itself has an effect on tax compliance.
The present paper shows that information about the prevalence of tax filing uncertainty
among others offers a morale justification to decrease one’s own level of tax morale.
Complex tax systems may thus not only have direct detrimental effects on tax com-
pliance through taxpayer confusion but may also undermine tax morale through negative
signals of peer compliance, i.e. once individuals become aware of other confused taxpay-
ers. I argue that these uncertainties may merely serve as an excuse since there are very
few opportunities to evade income taxes in Germany for the majority among the general
population in the survey on account of mandatory third-party reporting of dependent
incomes (see Kleven et al. (2011)) and the general duty to document most deduction pos-
sibilities when filing tax declarations (i.e. although they need to be submitted to the tax
authorities only after an explicit request). However, the results show that tax confusion
of others may still serve as an excuse for the general population for non-compliance.
Third, my findings relate to papers showing that social norms (here, tax morale) are
themselves endogenous (e.g. for evidence Bursztyn et al. (2020); for theoretical work, see
Benabou and Tirole (2011), Besley et al. (2019) and Acemoglu and Jackson (2017)). I find
that information about implications of complex taxes decreases tax morale, implying that
the design of tax systems can affect the compliance with the tax system (as hypothesized
by Luttmer and Singhal (2014), p. 165). Besley (2020b) also shows that norms like tax
morale in theory evolve dynamically over time as part of a social contract between citizens
and the state. The social contract entails that if the government fails to sufficiently
provide the public good, people then find it legitimate to withdraw their cooperation
with the state. The results of my paper suggest that taxpayer uncertainty among others
due to complex and ambiguous tax laws provides a possible excuse to opt-out of the social
contract with respect to tax compliance in the eyes of the general public.
Fourth and last, I speak to some recent evidence on the persistence of preferences in
different domains and the durability of interventions on social norms. While the stability
of other economic preferences was a subject of great interest in economics (see Einav et al.
(2012) regarding risk preferences; Ubfal (2016) on time-preferences and Helliwell et al.
(2016) as well as Bursztyn et al. (2020) on social norms), to the best of my knowledge
there is no paper reporting evidence on the within-subject persistence of tax morale.10
10Recently, Besley (2020a) shows strong intergenerational stability of tax morale across birth cohorts.
His data, however, do not look at the same individuals over time but at repeated cross-sections.
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2 Survey details and experimental design
2.1 Surveying tax morale
The main survey. I field the survey experiment in the German Internet Panel (GIP).11
The panel is organized as a omnibus survey, where researchers of different fields collect
information on attitudes and preferences relevant to economic and political decision mak-
ing (Blom et al., 2015).12 The survey ensures representativeness of the general German
population aged between 16–75 years based on a probability sample of both the German
offline and online population. A random draw of eligible households was recruited with
face-to-face interviews and was invited by postal mail to participate in bi-monthly web-
based surveys of the GIP. Households which did not have the necessary online access or
hardware equipment to participate in the online survey were provided web-access, web-
enabled devices and technical assistance (Blom et al., 2015). These efforts constitute
a rare and invaluable feature in survey research (Blom et al., 2015, 2016). Blom et al.
(2015, 2017) show that the inclusion of previously offline members of the general public
in a web-based survey significantly increase survey coverage and representativeness.
The survey-embedded experiment analyzed in this paper was conducted in March
2019 (wave 40) of the GIP. Altogether, 4,890 respondents participated in wave 40. 72
participants dropped out until the survey experiment and the main outcome question
was reached. Only 7 respondents chose not to answer the relevant outcome question to
my experiment, leaving me with 4,809 persons that participated in the experiment and
answered the tax morale question. While the experiment was fielded in wave 40 of the
GIP, the panel structure of the survey allows me to gauge detailed information about each
respondent from former waves of the GIP as well.13 The summary statistics discussed in
Section 2.4 outline all variables used in the main results of the paper.
Measuring tax morale. The measure of tax morale in this paper is based on the
following GIP question: How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes? The question
is an adapted version of the World Value Survey (WVS) version.14 Respondents could
11The GIP is a survey panel which is administered by the University of Mannheim in the framework of
the ”Collaborative Research Center 884 on Political Economy of Reforms” (SFB 884), which is funded
by the German Science Foundation (DFG).
12A general description of the GIP and its method of data collection can be found in Blom et al. (2015)
and online at https://www.uni-mannheim.de/en/gip/for-data-users/methodology/.
13The interested reader finds access to the detailed questionnaires via https://www.uni-mannheim.
de/en/gip/for-data-users/questionnaires-and-documentation/. The survey data are available
to the scientific community and every researcher can order access to the GIP data (for free) through
the following website: https://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/io-nas/sowi/reforms/internet_panel/
Data_access/.
14The WVS question reads: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think
it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Cheating on tax if you have the
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answer on a 6 point scale with response categories ranging from absolutely justifiable,
justifiable, rather justifiable, rather not justifiable, not justifiable, and absolutely not
justifiable.15 Higher values imply higher tax morale.
The question measures the general and unframed view of a respondent towards the
norm (and thus, his or her intrinsic motivation) to comply with taxes. Only about 10.06%
of all respondents stated that tax evasion is absolutely justifiable, justifiable, or rather
justifiable to them (i.e. 1.14, 2.52, and 6.4% of all answers, respectively), with 89.94%
of answers depicting that evading taxes is either rather not justifiable (19.67%), not
justifiable (35.95%) or absolutely not justifiable (34.31%). Comparably high levels of tax
morale for Germany were also found in Dörrenberg and Peichl (2018) in an earlier wave
of the GIP. The numbers are also well in line with similar questions from the WVS and
EVS (see Möhlmann (2014), Torgler (2002) and Feld and Torgler (2007) for tax morale in
Germany and related West-East differences). In the WVS wave 7 (2017-2020) Germany
also ranks 3rd with respect to stated tax morale levels in a sample of 48 countries (World
Value Survey, 2020). Hence, Germany is a country with a relatively high tax culture,
where evading taxes comes with a social stigma.
Survey-based measures of voluntary tax compliance are not free of criticism. For
instance, respondents may elevate their self-reported morality in surveys and answer not
truthfully (Andreoni et al., 1998). In line with this argumentation, Elffers et al. (1987) link
tax audit and survey data and find that self-reported tax compliance can be substantially
overstated. Other research, however, finds that survey-based levels of tax morale and
(perceived) tax evasion are strong correlates (Richardson, 2006; Frey and Torgler, 2007;
Torgler et al., 2008). Cummings et al. (2009) replicate the findings from artefactual field
experiments on tax compliance with self-reported survey measures of tax morale. Several
papers show also that tax morale is negatively correlated with the size of the shadow
economy (e.g. Alm and Torgler (2006) and Torgler (2005)). Notably, Halla (2012) finds
a direct causal link between tax morale and compliance behavior. According to Andreoni
et al. (1998, p. 837) survey data is especially useful in order to test taxpayer motivations
and behavior. This is exactly what the present paper does by using survey-based tax
morale with experimental interventions to test changes in voluntary compliance.
Moreover, the tax morale question represents a hypothetical and abstract concept
chance. The question is measured on a 10 point scale with one (1) meaning ’never justifiable’ and ten
(10) meaning ’always justifiable’. The European Value Survey (EVS) uses an identical formulation of the
question at hand. The tax morale question in the GIP does not include the qualification for taxpayers to
evaluate tax evasion if they had the opportunity to cheat. This is because the present analysis focuses on
changes in the justifiability of ’honest’ mistakes in tax filing due to taxpayer uncertainty from complex
taxes (see the experimental interventions in Section 2.2). Hence, the tax morale question is more general
and abstracts from the possibility of seeing a chance to evade taxes and intentionally use it.
15The original question in German reads: Fuer wie vertretbar halten Sie es Steuern zu hinterziehen?.
Response categories in original wording read: fuer sehr vertretbar, fuer vertretbar, fuer eher vertretbar,
fuer eher nicht vertretbar, fuer nicht vertretbar and fuer ueberhaupt nicht vertretbar.
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of tax compliance and does not ask directly about tax evasion behavior of respondents,
which should increase honesty in responses. Similar to the WVS and EVS, the GIP
survey is a comprehensive questionnaire where participants are not likely to get suspicious
about individual tax compliance questions and may answer more honestly. Based on
these considerations, I argue that the tax morale question in the GIP suits the purpose of
measuring changes in voluntary tax compliance across the following experimental groups.
Please note that the question explicitly asks the respondents about the justifiability of
tax evasion rather than the acceptance of the legal counterpart of tax avoidance.
2.2 Experimental interventions
Before eliciting their tax morale, survey participants were allocated to three experimen-
tal groups in a between-subject design: the control group, the Uncertainty as well as the
Unequal knowledge group. The experiment uses an augmented treatment structure which
gradually adds information. This means that respondents in the Uncertainty group re-
ceive the same information as the control group plus extra information, and those in the
Unequal knowledge group receive the same information as in the Uncertainty group as
well as extra information. Figure A.1, A.2 and A.3 of the Appendix show screenshots of
the respective experimental conditions.16 Please note that while it was not possible for me
to survey individual-level prior beliefs for the respective information treatments, treat-
ment effects may not only occur due to information but also due to a higher salience or a
priming of the information. However, given the fact that Section 3.4 provides evidence on
the persistence of my treatment interventions, I argue that my treatments indeed convey
new information that respondents then adapt in their stated decision-making.
Control group participants only read a short opener which states that tax evasion
is frequently discussed by the media. All experimental groups are preceded by that same
statement in order to introduce the topic of tax evasion and indicate its relevance to the
respondents. Just like survey items in other omnibus questionnaires, most questions in
the GIP are preceded by a short and neutral statement to familiarize respondents with a
new set of questions. 1,603 participants are being allocated to the control group.
Members of the Uncertainty group receive the following statement after the short
introductory opener about the relevance of tax evasion in the public debate: Tax laws are
often complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances. Given these complex-
ities of the tax system, many citizens are often not sure whether they report all incomes
correctly in their tax declaration. Subjects are thus informed about the tax confusion
of others and their uncertainty about declaring their taxable income.17 Since taxpayer
16See Dörrenberg and Peichl (2018) for a similar treatment structure.
17The treatment reflects foremost and primarily a tax morale channel which Luttmer and Singhal
(2014) categorize as peer effects and social influences. According to their review of the literature, these
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uncertainty cannot be easily measured, I do not rely on information on actual taxpayer
behavior but on information about taxpayer perceptions regarding tax filing (see below).18
The treatment represents a negative shock to intrinsic motivation (see also Besley et al.
(2019)) through information on peer behavior (here, perceptions). To be precise, the in-
formation acts as a negative shock for those who were not aware of this fact and assumed
that all or most taxpayers perceive tax filing as unproblematic. Specifically, respondents
are informed about the perceived difficulty among others in the German population with
respect to filing income taxes. The treatment is motivated by the fact that half of the
respondents in a prior GIP survey stated that they think filing their annual income tax
declaration is difficult or very difficult if they have filed their taxes themselves (see Blesse
et al. (2021)). Since I did not want to restrict the statement to those who file their
taxes themselves (about 62.8% of all respondents in the GIP, see Blesse et al. (2021)) as
compared to those who do not, i.e. if they do not have to file a tax return (for instance,
retirees) or if someone else files their return on their behalf (e.g. a spouse or a tax ad-
viser), I refer only to ”many citizens” as the relevant peer group and do not provide exact
figures on taxpayer uncertainty. The treatment then states that many citizens are often
not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly in their tax declaration.19 Among
others, this perception is well in line with recent papers reporting that complexity in tax
filing due to many tax rules leads to cognitive costs and poor decision quality (Aghion
et al., 2017; Benzarti, 2020; Abeler and Jaeger, 2015) as well as creating ambiguity in
compliance behavior (Bellemare et al., 2019).
The treatment information in the Uncertainty condition effectively reduces the
moral costs of evasion in the context of complex taxes since it signals that uncertain
taxpayers are not necessarily compliant. Non-compliance to complex tax rules is likely
to be unintended since people would not be aware of the consequences of their actions
channels, however, are not mutually exclusive and often go hand in hand. In fact, the treatment links
intrinsic motivation for tax compliance to government policy, e.g. the provision of transparent tax laws,
and can thus also be attributed to reciprocal motives of tax morale. If tax morale is (at least) in part
derived from benefits of taxation and the legitimacy or fairness of government policy, then tax morale
could be undermined (e.g. Besley (2020b), Besley et al. (2019) and Luttmer and Singhal (2014)). In
this specific case, people may perceive complex taxes as unfair (as shown by Blesse et al. (2021)) and
may opt-out of the social contract of complying with tax laws in response to unfair complexity. Early
lab evidence of Alm et al. (1992) further indicates that uncertainty in fiscal parameters of the economic
decision to evade taxes in the presence of public goods, i.e. in the presence of reciprocity, decrease tax
compliance significantly, highlighting a complementary role of uncertainty and reciprocity.
18Also, other papers resort to randomly giving survey-participants information about the beliefs, pref-
erences and actions of others (Bursztyn et al., 2020,?; Coibion et al., 2018). Just as in the present paper,
the relevant information from these papers is derived from survey-based perceptions.
19Supporting evidence for this implication of uncertainty comes from another GIP survey from March
2020, which asked about exactly what makes the income tax system difficult and where 40.16, 41.69 and
45.48% of all respondents reported that the scope of documentation requirements, the fear of forgetting
something important when filing one’s tax return or the fear of filing something wrong in the tax return
is making income tax declarations difficult (multiple answers were possible, see Blesse et al. (2021)).
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(or would not know any better).20 The treatment represents a descriptive social norm
which likely leads respondents to think evasion is more justifiable if taxpayer uncertainty
is common and resulting non-compliance is likely due to ’honest’ mistakes of taxpayers.
Essentially, the condition also tests whether respondents are conditionally cooperative
such that their intrinsic motivation to comply depends on the compliance behavior of
others (e.g. Frey and Torgler (2007) and Traxler (2010)). Altogether, I hypothesize that
the tax morale for this treatment is lower (as compared to the control group) because it
informs respondents that taxpayer uncertainty is common among the general population.
1,604 respondents receive the Uncertainty information.
Participants of the augmented treatment group additionally receive a further state-
ment after reading the opener. The respective Unequal knowledge group receives the
following message: Tax laws are often complicated due to many possible deductions and
allowances. Given these complexities of the tax system, many citizens are often not sure,
whether they report all incomes correctly in their tax declaration. Citizens who know tax
laws well or use a tax attorney can possibly take advantage of the complexities of the tax
law and reduce their tax burden. While the first treatment only gives information regard-
ing the uncertainty of ordinary citizens with respect to filing taxes, the second treatment
highlights that society is comprised of heterogeneous tax-payer groups by stating that
other taxpayers have the relevant tax knowledge (or access to it through tax attorneys)
and can actively influence their after-tax income. The Unequal knowledge condition thus
captures the existence of distinct coexisting tax-subcultures which differ in their levels of
tax compliance (Lewis, 1982; Traxler, 2010). In the present context, these groups differ
in compliance due to different abilities to comply with complex taxes and to influence
their after-tax income through tax knowledge.21 Knowledgeable taxpayers are also com-
municated as to make active use of tax knowledge in order to optimize their tax burden,
20Please note that the German tax law distinguishes between tax evasion and careless tax deficiency (so
called leichtfertige Steuerverkürzung). Both are based on witholding information to the tax authorities
which leads to a reduction of tax revenues but tax deficiency is based on light-mindedness and a lack of
knowledge while tax evasion is done on purpose (Fromm, 2019). Tax deficiency is thus associated with
lower levels of punishment than tax evasion and is classified as a petty offense (unlike the criminal act
of evasion). The law differentiates between these two acts based on the personal (ability to process) tax
knowledge. While the outcome question of the experiment, however, clearly refers to the act of evasion,
the treatment may lead to more empathy towards uncertain taxpayers which are presumably less able to
comply with the law and their non-compliance to be the likely result of ’honest’ mistakes in reporting.
This logic is also in line with practiced tax law, although taxpayers are oblidged to search for relevant
information to a reasonable extent. Legal information in this footnote are based on Fromm (2019).
21One may argue that everyone could potentially have access to relevant tax knowledge through active
websearch and consulting tax authorities (Hoopes et al., 2015), tax advisers (Chetty and Saez, 2013),
preparation software or their peer or personal networks (Alstadsæter et al., 2019; Chetty et al., 2013).
Acquiring information is, however, costly. According to Hoopes et al. (2015) taxpayers are rationally
attentive and search for tax-related information only when it seems useful to them. Other evidence
indicates that learning about taxes and how to benefit from them takes time, is far from complete, and
is especially hard for individuals with lower income and education, as well as the elderly (Aghion et al.,
2017). Hence, even though people learn about taxes in various ways (if need be), complex taxes remain
an important source of uncertainty for many taxpayers when making economic decisions.
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i.e. they exert avoidance activities. Evasion motives are explicitly not referred to in
order to avoid possible confounding effects due to the fact that people could associate
the Unequal knowledge group with such intentions. The condition also qualifies the first
statement further since many (but not all) citizens are subject to this uncertainty with
respect to complex taxes. The treatment is again motivated by earlier work on tax filing
perceptions as well as the finding that a majority believes that complex taxes (which are
based on abundant deduction possibilities) are contributing to larger perceived income
inequalities (see Blesse et al. (2021)) and that the rich engage in more tax evasion and
avoidance opportunities (Stantcheva, 2020).22 Essentially, the Unequal knowledge treat-
ment augments the Uncertainty condition in such a way that states many citizens may
be confused about filing their taxable income but other and more knowledgeable groups
exist which have better opportunities to optimize and improve their after-tax incomes.23
Conditional cooperation may be different with respect to these two groups of taxpay-
ers who differ in their opportunities to optimize their after-tax income through complex
tax rules (Traxler, 2010). The augmented treatment design enables me to test whether
people only care for the fact that taxpayer uncertainty exists or whether they also care
for the fact that there are others who know how to report their taxes. For the empir-
ical analysis, different outcomes are possible depending on what respondents perceive
as the social reference group (Traxler, 2010) when forming their beliefs on tax morale
under heterogeneous knowledge levels of the general population: First, if tax morale is
significantly higher for the Unequal knowledge than for the Uncertainty treatment, then
respondents likely view that uncertainty is less prevalent among the general population
than under the first treatment condition. Second, if tax morale is significantly lower for
the Unequal knowledge than for the Uncertainty condition, then respondents appear to
empathize relatively more with uncertain taxpayers and view it as a legitimate reason
not to comply with taxes, likely due to the fact that respondents perceive filing errors as
unintentional and because information acquisition or tax advise are perceived as costly.
Third, if the estimated coefficients of both treatments are different from zero but the
difference between both comparison groups is statistically indistinguishable, we cannot
22This perception of the general population corresponds with papers which find that, predominantly,
the very rich evade (Alstadsæter et al. (2019)), that more educated (and richer) individuals know more
about the tax code, learn faster and can adjust accordingly to tax incentives (Aghion et al., 2017) and
that tax professionals can help their clients to reduce tax liabilities (Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod,
1989) and are an important source of tax-relevant information for their clients (Chetty and Saez, 2013;
Chetty et al., 2013).
23In addition to fairness considerations due to reciprocity (see footnote 17 above), the unequal oppor-
tunities to influence after-tax incomes presented here may also change fairness perceptions with respect
to the allocation of tax payments across taxpayers (see Hashimzade et al. (2013), p. 972). Complex taxes
may thus also reduce tax morale through a more negative fairness perception of the tax system. Blesse
et al. (2021) finds that informing individuals about higher scope for avoidance and evasion opportuni-
ties in complex tax systems undermines the perception of the existing tax rules to be fair. Compliance
decisions for complex taxes are also directly linked to distributional motives (Bellemare et al., 2019).
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reject the notion that respondents only care for the disadvantaged and unaware taxpayers
when stating their tax morale. Please note that unlike to the Uncertainty treatment, I
do not have a clear a priori expectation about the effects of the second condition.
The respective treatment condition is comprised of 1,602 respondents in total.
2.3 Follow-up survey
In order to test the persistence of the experimental conditions of my main experiment
in wave 40 of the GIP, I use a follow-up question two months after the main survey in
the subsequent wave of the GIP. Follow-up surveys are also typically an effective way to
alleviate concerns about experimenter demand bias (e.g. Alesina et al. (2018); Haaland
and Roth (2019, 2020)). Altogether, 4,824 respondents participated in wave 41 of the
GIP in May 2019. 4,760 people answered the respective question on tax morale.
The tax morale question itself is slightly different, which should make it harder to
find persistent effects. The wording of the tax morale question in wave 41 reads: How
justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes if a good opportunity to do so presents itself?
with the same response categories as in wave 40 of the GIP. The question now added
a qualification with respect to the justification of tax evasion if a good opportunity to
do so presents itself. The question is thus closer to the WVS version and is equal to
the question Dörrenberg and Peichl (2018) use in an earlier wave of the GIP.24 The
question was preceded by the same opener statement as in wave 40 to gauge the interest
of respondents and to familiarize them with the context of tax evasion.
The distribution of responses for members of the control group appear to be largely
stable over time and in between questions (see Section 3.4). Note that any concerns about
consistent answering between subsequent survey waves of the GIP are very negligible since
both waves are fielded with a comparably large time gap of two months when compared
to other follow-up surveys present in the literature which are typically fielded only a few
weeks after the main intervention. Consistent survey answers in wave 40 and 41 are
further alleviated by the fact that the GIP is a omnibus survey module on a repeated
basis for the same set of individuals. This means that in both survey waves, tax morale
questions were placed in between questions of other topics which should further disguise
the connection between the question in the main survey and the follow-up question. While
the tax morale question in wave 40 was placed in between questions about the debt brake
and fiscal equalization in Germany as well as feedback questions at the end of the survey,
24The choice not to ask respondents exactly the same question in a follow-up experiment is inspired
by recent efforts made in obfuscated follow-up surveys (pioneered by Haaland and Roth (2019) and
Haaland and Roth (2020)) which aim to alleviate concerns of experimenter demand effects in survey
experiments. Effectively, obfuscated follow-up surveys measure persistence of treatment effects from
information experiments using a short follow-up survey after the main information intervention while
taking steps to disguise the connection between main survey and follow-up (Haaland et al., 2020).
13
the tax morale question in wave 41 was embedded in a question about redistribution
preferences as well as public support for EU policy reforms. The respondents are also not
aware of the identity of the involved researchers when answering questions.
2.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides detailed summary statistics of the demographic structure of the GIP
survey data.25 The table reflects the respective sample information regarding household
size, age structure, marital and retirement status as well as employment, education,
household income and political orientation. Not all information were necessarily surveyed
in wave 40 where the survey experiment was fielded but may come from earlier survey
waves. Specifically, I matched information on both political preferences derived from a
variable with respect to a person’s self-placement on a 11 point left-right scale as well
as elicited net household incomes from wave 37 to the current survey. Moreover, some
attributes of respondents that do not regularly change over time (e.g. gender or education
status) are typically updated only about once a year and are also linked to the current
survey wave.
The table indicates that the most frequent household size covers two household
members (43%) and 17% of participants live in single households. The sample pool
reaches a balanced gender composition with 48% females and covers all age cohorts with
a somewhat higher share of older participants (24% being between 49 and 58 years old
and 31% being at least 58 years old) corresponding with an ageing German society. 58%
of all participants are married. The sample comprises 46% full-time workers and 19%
retirees. Participants are also well distributed across education levels. About 31% of all
respondents are highly educated, i.e. have a tertiary degree. Individuals are split in 5
net household income groups ranging from poor (less than 1500 Euro) to rich (more than
4500 Euro). 30%, 27% and 14% of respondents have net household incomes of less 1500
Euro, 1500≥x<2500 Euro or 2500≥x<3500 Euro. Only 6% and 5% have either between
3500 and 4500 Euro or are ’rich’ with more than 4500 Euro. 13% of all participants do
not declare their household income to the interviewers and income information of 6% of
individuals cannot be matched to the current survey. Furthermore, the sample appears
to have a relatively balanced distribution with respect to political ideology, with 40% of
individuals being labeled as conservatives and 44% being categorized as left-wing. 11%
of respondents do not declare a political ideology (non-partisans).26
25Similar to Blesse et al. (2021), I argue that since the GIP is based on a probability-based represen-
tative sample of the general German population, there is no need to compare demographic background
information from survey respondents to official population statistics or other representative data.
26Left-right preferences are measured on a 11-point scale from right to left, where ’conservative’ is
<= 5 on this scale, see Blesse et al. (2021) for a similar coding). I cannot match political preferences for
5% of respondents to wave 40 of the GIP.
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2.5 Balancedness of experimental groups
Table A.1 of the Appendix tests the balancedness of the experimental groups with respect
to the demographic information summarized earlier in Section 2.4. Specifically, I run three
OLS regressions for each covariate which can be formulated as follows: yi = βCovariatei+
εi. While Covariatei represents the respective covariate listed above, the dependent
variables depict dummy variables for the respective treatment status for each participant
i, i.e. being either among the control group, the Uncertainty or the Unequal Knowledge
group. Testing balancedness of covariates across treatment groups in survey-embedded
experiments using this procedure is standard in the literature (for similar approaches, see
for example Alesina et al. (2018)). Given 9 covariates and 3 dummies representing my
experimental conditions, I end up with 27 separate regressions in total. These regressions
yield 66 estimated coefficients and I find that only one is significant at the 10% significance
level and 5 and 2 are significant at the 5 and 1% significance level, respectively. This is
by and large in line with the estimates being significant within their margin of error. All
in all, randomization by computer appears to have worked properly, which allows me to
derive causal inference using the implemented survey experiment. Please note that I still
control for covariates in my main specifications in order to reduce standard errors and
increase the precision of the estimates of interest.
3 Results
This section outlines the results of the experimental interventions on tax morale.
3.1 Main results
Graphical evidence. Figure 1 shows the average response for the tax morale question
and a 95% confidence interval. Average responses on tax morale on a 6-point Likert scale
equal 5.08 in the control group as well as 4.78 and 4.83 in the Uncertainty and Unequal
Knowledge group, respectively. P-values from two sample t-tests indicate that responses
differ significantly with p<0.01 between control group and both treatment groups. The
respective p-value of 0.1381 from this test does, however, not reject the hypothesis of
mean equality of the Uncertainty and Unequal Knowledge group.
Regression model. Now I present the results of the following OLS regression
Moralei = β1Treati + β2Covariatei + εi,
where I measure tax morale Moralei of respondent i on a 6-point Likert scale (ranging
from 1 evasion ’absolutely justifiable’ to 6 ’absolutely not justifiable’). Treati represent
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dummy variables for either the Uncertainty and Unequal Knowledge group. The respec-
tive coefficients of these variables are the treatment effects of interest relative to the
omitted control group. In my preferred specification, I also control for a full set of covari-
ates (Covariatei) which comprise demographic information such as household size, age
groups, marital status, gender, employment status, retirement and education categories
as well as disposable household income and political preferences, i.e. left-wing ideology.
Reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. I use OLS specifications
in the main regressions in order to ease interpretation of the treatment effects of interest.
Alternative model specifications, including Linear Probability Models (LPM) as well as
Ordered Probit Models are tested as robustness checks in Section 3.2.
Main effects. Table 2 shows the regression results for the effects of the experimental
interventions on tax morale. Column (1) shows the coefficients of the treatment dummies
relative to the control group without controlling for any covariates. The other columns
add further covariates in order to improve statistical precision. Specifically, column (2)
controls for demographic information including gender, age, marital status, household
size, employment status, retirement status, and education, while column (3) adds house-
hold income information and column (4) additionally accounts for political preferences.27
The coefficient of the Uncertainty treatment is negative in all specifications and
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that providing information about
the prevalence of uncertainty in filing taxes among citizens in the context of complex tax
systems does indeed has a negative effect on tax morale, making people more accepting
of tax evasion. Uncertainty here likely results in ’honest’ mistakes of taxpayers in their
income reporting rather than evading on purpose. The effects are very stable across
specifications. In my preferred specification of Column (4) which controls for a full set
of controls, the Uncertainty treatment reduces tax morale by about 6.8% (-0.300/4.358)
when evaluated at the conditional control group average, relative to the control group
which did not receive further information. Therefore, the results imply that individual
tax morale is elastic to salient uncertainties among peers from complex tax systems.
Hence, respondents use information about taxpayer uncertainty as an excuse for a lower
motivation to comply with taxes and judge evasion less harshly. The effect relative to
the control group amounts to 0.278 of a standard deviation. The effect size may be not
very large in economic terms but needs to be interpreted against the background of a
very strong support for tax morale among respondents.
The Unequal knowledge treatment also shows consistently negative treatment effects
across all columns and is statistically significant at the 1% level when compared to the
control condition. The treatment essentially augments the uncertainty treatment with
27For a discussion of the effects of individual covariates on tax morale, please see the paragraph below.
16
a contrasting statement that certain people (i.e. those with tax knowledge or those
with access to tax advise) can indeed make proper use of the tax system in their favor.
The respective coefficients are thus somewhat weaker as compared to the Uncertainty
treatment. When evaluated at the control group average, the treatment effect ranges from
a -5.5 to -5.6% change to the control group. Again, point estimates are very stable across
specifications. Joint F-tests do not show that both treatment groups are significantly
different at conventional levels. In my preferred specification of Column (4), the p-value
of the respective F-test is 0.143. Also in economic terms the difference of effect sizes is
small, representing only about 0.1 standard deviations. Hence, highlighting the presence
of other knowledgeable taxpayers which can have optimize their tax burden does not
affect the likelihood of people using the fact that other taxpayers are confused when filing
taxes as an excuse for a lower motivation to pay taxes. Taken together, these findings
suggest that information about taxpayer confusion from complex taxes among others
offers an opportunity for taxpayers to make excuses and reduce their own tax morale.
Highlighting the fact that other taxpayers may be less affected by this uncertainty and
can utilize complex tax rules does not affect voluntary compliance further.
Discussing the anatomy of tax morale. Table 3 shows the ‘anatomy’ of elicited tax
morale using OLS regressions of tax morale on different sets of covariates via a broad
set of observable respondent characteristics. The control variables are similar to those
being used in the baseline regressions studying the effect of both treatment interventions
on tax morale (see Table 2). However, Table 3 illustrates the influence of individual
background characteristics on tax morale. Thus, the results of Table 3 show which
(socio-demographic) group is more or less likely to find tax evasion justifiable. Please
note that the respective coefficients of the included covariates show only (conditional)
correlations but do not reflect causal relationships. Detecting heterogeneous responses to
the tax morale question allows me, however, to get an impression of how well drivers of
tax morale among the general population in the GIP correspond to existing evidence.
Column (1)–(3) always control for the allocation of respondents to both treatment
interventions and gradually add covariates. Specifically, Column (1) considers demo-
graphic features (gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status, re-
tirement status, and education), column (2) adds net household income categories and
column (3) also includes political preferences, i.e. left-right political ideology. The re-
sults suggest that important determinants of elicited tax morale are age and gender.
Specifically, we find that older respondents have a statistically higher tax morale which is
independent of other factors that go along with seniority such as marrital status, employ-
ment, being retired or having higher income. Moreover, women have a higher tax morale.
Both age and gender effects are in line with the evidence from developed and developing
countries (e.g. Frey and Torgler (2007) and Alm and Torgler (2006); for a brief review of
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this literature, see Dörrenberg and Peichl (2013)) and also fit to findings from a related
paper on tax morale using GIP data (Dörrenberg and Peichl, 2018). Corroborating with
most existing papers (again, see the brief review in Dörrenberg and Peichl (2013)), be-
ing married correlates significantly with higher tax morale, albeit only at the 10% level
(for example, see also Alm and Torgler (2006)). Unlike Dörrenberg and Peichl (2018),
however, we do find robust evidence that stated tax morale increases statistically with
a higher individual education status. According to Table 3, education is a significant
and positive determinant of tax morale. While existing evidence is also ambiguous with
respect to the effect of income on tax morale,28 I find statistically significant effects for
the highest declared income category suggesting that higher incomes have a somewhat
higher tax moreale. Interestingly, I also find statistically significant and positive effects
on tax morale when respondents do not declare their income in the survey. Furthermore,
the results suggest that respondents with a left-wing political ideology have a higher tax
morale compared to rather conservative individuals. This finding matches evidence from
Dörrenberg and Peichl (2018) using an earlier wave of the GIP. Finally, I do not find
significant effects of household size, employment status, and retirement on tax morale.
3.2 Robustness checks and extensions
Sensitivity checks. In the following, I present evidence that speaks to the robustness of
the main results. Firstly, I test whether a binary measure of tax morale leads to different
treatment effects. In order to do this, I code tax morale as a dummy variable being 1 if
responses are equal to 4, 5 or 6 for the question: ”How justifiable do you think it is to
evade taxes?” which is measured on a 6-point scale, and 0 if otherwise. Table A.2 of the
Appendix estimates the respective Linear Probability (LPM) models on both treatment
dummies and using a binary measure of tax morale. The effects remain qualitatively very
similar to the main specification with both treatment effects being consistently significant
across specifications at the 1% level. Again, the Uncertainty treatment results in larger
point estimates than the Unequal knowledge group, although both groups are repeatedly
not significantly different from one another according to joint F-tests.
While the main specifications (and the LPM models) use OLS in order to ease the
interpretation of the treatment effects, the tax morale question is measured on a 6-point
Likert scale, which may speak for alternative model specifications that directly account for
the discrete and ordinal nature of the outcome variable. Hence and secondly, I use ordered
probit models to account for the ordered nature of the tax morale variable. Table A.3 of
the Appendix shows the respective results. The treatment effects are again very similar
to the baseline results using ordinary least squares. Accounting for the ordinary nature
28Some papers find positive (e.g. Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010)), some insignificant (e.g. Konrad
and Qari (2012)) and others find negative effects (e.g. Alm and Torgler (2006)).
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of the outcome variable, we can, however, reject that both treatment groups are equal at
the 10% level. Therefore, it seems that the negative treatment effects of the Uncertainty
condition are statistically somewhat stronger than with the second augmented treatment
group. However, just like in the main results the respective differences between both
experimental groups are typically not meaningful in an economic sense.29
Do changes in tax morale vary across compliance levels? Moreover, I show how
the experimental conditions change the distribution of response categories differently
across experimental groups. Preliminary evidence can be taken from a test of difference
in distributions.30 To test the shift in response distributions econometrically, I do the
following: For each of the six response categories of the tax morale question ranging
from (1) the respondent finds tax evasion absolutely justifiable to (6) the respondent
states that he/she deems tax evasion absolutely not justifiable, I create an individual
dummy variable. Then, I use each of these six binary tax morale variables as alternative
dependent variables in LPM specifications. Table 4 shows the respective results for all
response categories and both treatment conditions.31 All specifications account for a full
set of covariates. This exercise helps to understand whether the negative information
effect of tax confusion among peers on individual tax morale results from a decline in
several answer categories or only from the highest levels of motivation (see Dwenger et al.
(2016) and Dwenger and Treber (2018) for the role of different motivational types for the
effectiveness of rewards or shaming on tax compliance, respectively).
While most answers can be found in the highest response category of tax evasion
being absolutely not justifiable (41.42% of answers in the control group), both treatment
conditions show large negative treatment effects in this category which are statistically
significant at the 1% level. While respondents in the Uncertainty group chose this cat-
egory about 12.5 percentage points less often on average, subjects in the augmented
treatment chose it about 8.1 percentage points less often. According to the table, the en-
tire negative average treatment effects emerge from a reduction of answers in the highest
29In addition to potential concerns about the implications of misspecification to my main estimates, I
also check whether the inclusion of covariates in the main results leads to a sample selection bias since not
all covariates are necessarily observed for all respondents. Table A.4 of the Appendix shows the regression
results when using the reduced sample of 4,635 respondents for which all covariates are available, which
we use as control variables across all specifications. My main results prevail when gradually adding
control variables and keeping the number of observations fixed throughout all specifications.
30While I rejected the hypothesis of mean equality between both treatment groups in my baseline
estimates, the distributions appear to differ between groups. P-values from pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnoff
tests indicate that responses differ significantly with p<0.01 between control group and both treatment
groups, respectively. The respective p-value of 0.075 from that test rejects the equality of the distributions
in the Uncertainty and Unequal knowledge groups at the 10% level.
31Figure A.4 of the Appendix illustrates the treatment effects across individual answer categories to the
tax morale question graphically without conditioning on additional covariates in a regression framework.
The results are, however, very similar to Table 4 in the main text.
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category of tax morale, i.e. from the most ”honest taxpayers”. The difference in effects
between both treatment groups, however, is significant at the 1% level. Other answer cat-
egories do not show significant negative treatment effects. However, the treatment groups
shift response patterns somewhat differently. While both groups show significantly more
answers in response category 4 (tax evasion somewhat not justifiable), i.e. they alleviate
concerns about evasion by making it look more legitimate through the prevalence of un-
certainty in filing taxes from complex tax declarations, the augmented Unequal knowledge
treatment significantly shifts preferences from category 6 even towards response category
2 (evasion being justifiable). The Uncertainty group also significantly shifts respondents
towards category 3 (evasion being somewhat justifiable) if compared to the control group.
Altogether, this set of findings speaks to the fact that peer information about taxpayer
confusion especially reduces the share of highly motivated individuals in our between
subject design. The Unequal knowledge condition has a significantly lower effect on very
high levels of tax morale than the Uncertainty group and thus alleviates the extent to
which participants perceive tax confusion to be present among others.
3.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects
In the following, I analyze whether certain groups of participants respond more or less
elastically to either of the treatment interventions with respect to their tax morale. In
order to do this, I interact the treatment dummies with different characteristics of the
sample population. Given the longitudinal structure of the survey data, I can exploit rich
background information on each respondent from previous survey waves. I implement
an explorative analysis as to whether specific individual characteristics (listed below)
can explain my baseline findings.32 All related results need thus to be interpreted as
suggestive and not as causal. Specifically, I tested the following heterogeneities:
Demographic structure. Demographic information comprise marital status, sex, be-
ing full time employed, religion, being rich (i.e. in the highest income category), having
dependent work, being self employed (all drawn from wave 40) and education (wave 39).
Individual perceptions of income tax system. Other tests explicitly check for het-
erogeneous treatment effects by individual tax perceptions. Specifically, I test sub-group
32Given the vast amount of detailed background characteristics for each respondent (e.g. a 20 to 25
minute survey was sent to all participants every second month since the start of the GIP in 2012 until my
experiment was fielded in March 2019), which all could be used to identify predictors of treatment effects
using machine learning (ML) algorithms (Chernozhukov et al., 2018; Wager and Athey, 2018), I abstain
from data driven selection methods for my sub-group analysis due to power and attrition problems which
would complicate ML methods. Instead, I choose to run the sub-group analysis of treatment effects in
an exploratory fashion in order to document interesting results following the argument in Duflo et al.
(2020). At the same time, I interpret these results as suggestive and not as causal in nature.
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effects of the treatment indicators with respect to the perceived difficulty in filing one’s
own income tax declaration, the personal use of itemization in annual income tax decla-
rations, the preference for a more simple tax system as well as the perceived implication
of deductions on income inequalities (wave 36; for more detail, see Blesse et al. (2021))
as well as prior levels of tax morale drawn from wave 39. I also use data for individual
attitudes on whether tax evasion should be prosecuted and whether taxpayers should
have more influence on public spending (both retrieved from wave 39).33
Attitudes towards redistribution and government. I also check whether redis-
tributive preferences (wave 35) and government trust (wave 40) affect treatment effects.
Generally, I find that the treatment effects for both experimental conditions appear
to be very stable across most sub-groups. The results suggest that only political ideology
and older age groups (both from wave 40) appear to have significant and robust effects
on the experimental interventions and thus, contribute to my treatment effects.
Table 5 depicts the respective results from the interaction models. I only report
interaction effects which are significant at conventional levels. Note that I also do not
find that other variables explain the treatment effects in a consistent manner. Column
(1)-(2) report interaction effects of both treatments with measures of political ideology.
Column (3)-(4) reports interaction effects of both treatments with age categories. For
each dimension of heterogeneity, I first report results without control variables (column
(1) & (3)) and then add a full-set of covariates with information on demographics, income
and political preferences used in earlier regressions (column (2) & (4)).
Older respondents (48 < age <= 58 and age > 58) respond significantly more nega-
tive regarding their tax morale when being confronted with the prevalence of uncertainty
in filing income taxes. The negative effect of the Uncertainty group in Table 5 increases
with age but only becomes significant for the two oldest age groups at conventional lev-
els.34 This corresponds with evidence from Blesse et al. (2021) that preferences towards
more simple tax systems are more prevalent among older citizens. These findings also
correspond to results from Aghion et al. (2017) that older individuals know less about
tax incentives and are also less able to learn, indicating cognitive costs in adjustment
33I also test whether it matters if respondents declare themselves or whether they let others report
their tax return (such as spouses or tax attorneys). The respective information comes from wave 36 of
the GIP. While I cannot exactly distinguish the third party that reports one’s income, this information
may be valuable by itself in order to answer whether the exposure to self-reporting makes one more
sensitive to information about tax complexity in tax reporting. While I do not find that own reporting
is driving the respective treatment effects in my experiment, this may be due to the fact that I can only
use about 2,000 observations of my main estimation sample (including controls) from wave 40.
34I also find a significant negative effect for respondents who are retired but the effect is arguably
nested in the oldest age group. Since the interaction effect for age > 58 prevails even when controlling
for a full set of controls (including retirement status), I argue that the age effect drives the main results
with respect to the Uncertainty group independent of the retirement status of the respective participant.
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to complex tax rules. My results suggest that this group is more lenient towards tax
evasion when being informed about the uncertainty of many taxpayers when filing taxes.
Older respondents also have a higher tax morale on average (see Table 3). I argue that
higher cognitive costs among old individuals (see Aghion et al. (2017)) make them more
susceptible for using the uncertainty of others as an excuse for lower tax morale.
Table 5 also shows that the negative effect of the augmented treatment group can
be explained by political ideology. Participants with a left-leaning political ideology have
a significantly more negative shift in their tax morale in the Unequal knowledge treat-
ment as compared to conservatives. Thus, left-wing ideology does not only correlate with
higher tax morale (for the respective results, see Table 3), it also makes people also more
receptive for distributional concerns regarding tax morale in the context of tax complex-
ity. This is in line with Alesina et al. (2018) who find a large role of political preferences
in a survey experiment on redistributive preferences. In their study, left-wing respon-
dents demand more redistribution after receiving pessimist information about inequality
of opportunity. Corresponding with their finding, I find that left-wing participants care
more about the uncertainty of ‘other’ taxpayers when they are framed as inequitable.
Specifically, they reduce their tax morale in response to the information that some tax-
payers cannot optimize their after-tax income due their lack of tax knowledge, while
others with that respective knowledge or sufficient access to it can. Accordingly, subjects
with left-wing ideology appear to find tax evasion more justifiable, likely as a means of
redistribution towards the ‘unlucky’ mass of confused tax filers. My results are robust to
interaction models which measure political preferences using individual German parties
where I find that the respective effect is driven by the socialist party (Die Linke).
3.4 Follow-up
Now I present the empirical results on the persistence of the experimental conditions
using a follow-up survey two months after the main experiment (see 2.3 for details).
Main results. In order to draw conclusions on the persistence of the experimental
conditions regarding tax morale, I match the respective treatment and control group
variation from the tax morale experiment in wave 40 of the GIP to the subsequent follow-
up survey wave (wave 41) where a similar but slightly changed tax morale question was
asked to the same respondents (see Section 2.1 and 2.3 for details on the exact wording).
Given the panel structure of the GIP, I can exploit how responses to the tax morale
survey item have changed for the same individual two months after the main experiment.
First, it may be interesting to know for the reader how persistent tax morale pref-
erences are over time. Given that most papers on the issue of survey-measures of tax
compliance use repeated cross-sections of survey data rather than longitudinal surveys
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(e.g. WVS or EVS), not much is known about how much individuals change their opinion
on the acceptability of tax evasion over time. To the best of my knowledge, I provide first
evidence on within-subject stability regarding tax morale. Figure 2 shows the changes in
individual response patterns between survey waves for control group members. Specifi-
cally, it depicts the difference of tax morale responses from wave 41 to wave 40. Notably,
the majority of participants with about 55.3% do not change their opinion with respect to
tax morale. Only 20.6% of respondents show a decrease and approximately 24.09% of par-
ticipants state an increase in tax morale between subsequent survey waves. Altogether,
tax morale preferences appear to be rather stable over time for a given individual.
Second, I study how the experimental interventions of the main experiment change
tax morale over time using the follow-up question. In order to do that, I restrict the
sample of the follow-up survey wave to respondents who were also part of the experiment
in the main survey. This leaves me with a high rate of 91.47% (N=4,405) which underwent
the experiment in wave 40 and answered the tax morale question in the follow-up survey.
Accordingly, I argue that attrition should not be a main concern when interpreting the
follow-up results.35 Covariates in the follow-up are also well balanced with respect to the
relevant treatment interventions from wave 40 (see Table A.6 of the Appendix).
In order to estimate treatment effects, I simply regress tax morale survey responses
(now from wave 41) on the treatment dummies of the main experiment in wave 40 using
simple OLS, omitting the control group dummy. Table 6 depicts the results of the respec-
tive estimations. While column (1) includes only the treatment dummies in the regression
but abstains from including covariates, columns (2) to (4) gradually add information on
demographic characteristics, income and political ideology of the individual respondents.
While the Uncertainty treatment does not appear to have strong lasting effects
on stated tax morale, its augmented version, the Unequal knowledge condition, which
further specifies who can properly use tax deductions to their advantage, indeed shows
a significant negative effect on tax morale. The effect is statistically significant at the
5% level and appears to be somewhat weaker than in the main experiment (i.e. 27%
of the estimate in the main survey). The effect is also significantly different from the
effect of the Uncertainty condition as illustrated by the rejection of a joint F-test with
a p-value of 0.086. However, the step-wise inclusion of covariates in order to increase
precision of estimation in columns (2) to (4) renders the treatment effect of the augmented
experimental group insignificant at conventional levels (i.e. with a p-value of 0.120).
As seen before in Section 3.2, average treatment effects of peer information may,
however, mask important heterogeneities and especially very honest taxpayers may be
deterred by the tax confusion of others. Hence, I again estimate the respective treatment
effects of treatment conditions on individual tax morale answer categories in order to in-
35Table A.5 of the Appendix also shows that neither of the treatment conditions of wave 40 significantly
affect the likelihood to answer the follow-up question. The calculations are based on 4,438 observations.
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vestigate whether different types of tax morale react differently even two months after the
intervention. Table 7 shows the respective results. It seems that also in the follow-up only
very honest tax morale categories are negatively affected by peer information about filing
uncertainty. Both treatment conditions are significantly different from the control condi-
tion although the Unequal knowledge effect is somewhat larger and statistically significant
at the 1% level as compared to the 10% significance level of the Uncertainty condition.
Both effects are not significantly different from each other. While the negative effect
among very honest tax responses is shifted to harsher judgements on tax evasion in the
main survey (see Table 4), we now see a statistically significant shift of answers towards
category 5 (i.e. from evasion being absolutely not justifiable towards evasion being not
justifiable only). Altogether, it appears that peer information about tax uncertainty of
others has persistent effects on very honest levels of tax morale but that resulting changes
in judgments grow less harsh over time and effects become somewhat less strong. The
Uncertainty and Unequal knowledge effect amount to 24.6% (-0.031/-0.126) and 64.2%
(-0.052/-0.081) among very honest tax morale levels in the follow-up when compared to
the main survey (and the baseline results in Table 2), respectively. Persistent treatment
effects also suggest that new information rather than the mere salience of the conveyed
arguments is the main source in the observed changes in voluntary tax compliance.36
Heterogeneous effects on persistence. As for the main experiment, I only report
heterogeneous effects of the experimental interventions in the follow-up survey when sig-
nificant effects at conventional levels could be found. Table 8 depicts the heterogeneous
effects for the follow-up question on tax morale. While Column (1) does not condition
on covariates, Column (2) includes a full-set of covariates covering information on de-
mographics, income as well as political preferences. In line with the null results on the
average treatment effects of the Uncertainty condition on the elicited tax morale in the
follow-up, I do not find significant sub-group effects for this treatment. There is no partic-
ular sub-group of the sample where lasting effects from the main survey carry over to the
follow-up questionnaire. However, for the augmented Unequal knowledge condition, very
similar effects emerge in wave 41 for left-wing respondents when compared to the baseline
effects from wave 40. Respondents with left-wing political ideology can also explain the
negative baseline effects for that experimental intervention in the follow-up survey. Neg-
ative effects of the augmented treatment on the elicited tax morale for left-wing subjects
(as compared to conservatives) are statistically significant at the 1% level without con-
ditioning on additional covariates. The results are very similar when including a full-set
36Different treatment effects in the follow-up for both treatment conditions may also be due to a
slightly different question wording which now asks how justifiable tax evasion is when an opportunity
presents itself (rather than the justifiability in a general sense as in wave 40). Respondents may have
the feeling that these opportunities can be mostly associated with people that have tax knowledge (or
access to it), partly explaining the negative effect of the Unequal knowledge condition.
24
of controls but are somewhat less precise and significant at the 5% level.
Persistent effects of the Unequal knowledge treatment for this sub-group suggest
that respondents with a left-wing ideology identify themselves with and empathize with
disadvantaged uncertain taxpayers and thus internalize the perception of prevalent uncer-
tainties among peers in their own views on tax morale (for the relevance of identification
within groups for the norm of tax compliance, see also Wenzel (2004)).
The results for the follow-up are remarkable for several reasons. First, as argued
above, tax morale is rather stable over time (even despite slightly different question
wordings). Second, the main experiment only gave short statements about certain aspects
of the public perception of the tax system but the overall extent of the intervention
was small and subtle. Third, the follow-up estimates should be interpreted as being
conservative because the follow-up was fielded two months after the main experiment,
which is a substantial amount of time as compared to other follow-up surveys in the
literature. Typically, follow-ups are implemented shortly after the main intervention
(e.g. one week, for instance, in Alesina et al. (2018); Haaland and Roth (2019, 2020)).
4 Conclusion
Taxes are complicated and people also frequently perceive them as such, which may result
in uncertainty among many taxpayers how to file taxes themselves but may also create
room for negative spillovers on tax compliance. The present paper addresses the latter
and answers the question whether perceived taxpayer confusion among others serves as
an excuse for tax non-compliance using a novel survey experiment among Germans.
I find supportive evidence for the hypothesis that the intrinsic motivation of tax
compliance is undermined when people are informed about the prevalent uncertainty
among other taxpayers. Given that a large majority among the German population is
in favor of a simpler tax system and about half perceive their tax returns as difficult
(see Blesse et al. (2021)), this finding speaks to the fact that people on average do not
extrapolate their own difficulties with respect to tax filing onto others but people do
empathize with the uncertainty of others in filing taxes once they are aware of it. The
treatment effect is largely not different from the Unequal knowledge treatment, which
augments the uncertainty information with a statement about other taxpayers possessing
the tax knowledge (or having access to it through tax advice) to reduce their tax burden.
Negative effects of peer information are driven by a reduction among very honest
taxpayers. Older respondents also show more empathy with taxes being evaded when they
become aware of the tax uncertainty of others. Similarly, left-wing subjects show a higher
tax morale in the control group (as compared to conservatives) but have significantly
lower tax morale when receiving the augmented treatment. This effect remains virtually
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identical in a follow-up survey two months after the main experiment. It appears that left-
wing respondents internalized a more lenient view on tax evasion over time when being
informed that many citizens are uncertain on how to file their taxes and, unlike those
possessing knowledge about complex taxes, cannot use their tax declaration to reduce
their tax burden. I also find significant negative effects of both treatment conditions
among very high tax morale levels in the follow-up but it appears that resulting changes
from peer information in judgments on tax evasion grow somewhat less strong over time.
Hence, by randomly providing respondents with information about tax uncertainty
among others, I find evidence of a potentially long-lasting erosion of tax morale among
very high levels of tax morale as well as for left-wing subjects in a high-morale context
such as the German income tax. My findings can likely be applied to other developed
countries with high levels of tax morale and complicated tax systems (such as the US).
Ultimately, my results raise concerns that complex tax systems may not only have
direct detrimental effects on tax compliance through taxpayer confusion but may also
undermine tax morale through negative signals of peer compliance, i.e. once one becomes
aware of other confused taxpayers. In turn, these negative spillover effects may lead to
lower effective fiscal capacities in typically high morale contexts in the long-run (Besley,
2020b) if treatment effects are persistent or if individuals receive regular signals about
the negative perceptions of other taxpayers. Taxpayers can (at least to some extent)
become aware of related perceptions of others. First, the political debate recurrently
involves reform proposals which aim at simplifying the tax schedule (see Blesse et al.
(2021)) and which are often motivated by the fact that many taxpayers are confused
by the tax schedule. Second, recent evidence of Chetty et al. (2013) indicates that tax
knowledge can diffuse locally in networks such as among welfare recipients who need to
file similar tax forms or through the presence of tax advisers. One can argue that not
only tax knowledge but also related uncertainties can spread among peers although only
to a limited extent since information likely diffuses rather within than between groups.
Against this background, policy makers not only have to account for negative direct
effects of taxpayer confusion such as low take-up rates of tax benefits (Chetty et al.,
2013; Bhargava and Manoli, 2015) or suboptimal behavioral adjustments (e.g. Abeler
and Jaeger (2015) and Feldman et al. (2016)) but also do need to consider potential
related negative spillover effects on voluntary tax compliance when designing tax rules.
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contractâ. Econometrica 88 (4), 1359–1362.
Besley, T. (2020b). State capacity, reciprocity and the social contract. Economet-
rica 88 (4), 1307–1335.
27
Besley, T., A. Jensen, and T. Persson (2019). Norms, enforcement, and tax evasion.
NBER Working Paper No. 25575.
Bhargava, S. and D. Manoli (2015). Psychological frictions and the incomplete take-
up of social benefits: Evidence from an IRS field experiment. American Economic
Review 105 (11), 3489–3529.
Blesse, S., F. Buhlmann, and P. Dörrenberg (2021). Attitudes towards tax
simplification: Evidence from a representative survey and experiments.
https://www.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/media/Lehrstuehle/bwl/Doerrenberg/
tax_complexity_20210108.pdf. Online; accessed 18 January 2021.
Blesse, S. and F. Heinemann (2020). Citizensâ trade-offs in state merger decisions:
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5 Main figures and tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Experimental intervention
Control 4890 0.33 0.47 0 1
Uncertainty 4890 0.33 0.47 0 1
Unequal knowledge 4890 0.33 0.47 0 1
Demographics
Single households 4876 0.17 0.38 0 1
2 4876 0.43 0.50 0 1
3 4876 0.18 0.39 0 1
4 4876 0.16 0.36 0 1
5+ 4876 0.05 0.23 0 1
Age <=28 4887 0.14 0.35 0 1
Age 29-38 4887 0.15 0.36 0 1
Age 39-48 4887 0.16 0.36 0 1
Age 49-58 4887 0.24 0.43 0 1
Age >= 59 4887 0.31 0.46 0 1
Married 4890 0.58 0.49 0 1
Female 4888 0.48 0.50 0 1
Full time-employed 4866 0.46 0.50 0 1
Retired 4866 0.19 0.40 0 1
Low education 4746 0.04 0.20 0 1
Low-med education 4746 0.42 0.49 0 1
High-med education 4746 0.24 0.42 0 1
High education 4746 0.31 0.46 0 1
Personal net income
Poor 4890 0.30 0.46 0 1
2 4890 0.27 0.44 0 1
3 4890 0.14 0.35 0 1
4 4890 0.06 0.23 0 1
Rich 4890 0.05 0.21 0 1
No income stated 4890 0.13 0.34 0 1
Not merged 4890 0.06 0.23 0 1
Political orientation
Conservatives 4890 0.40 0.49 0 1
Left-wing 4890 0.44 0.50 0 1
Non partisans 4890 0.11 0.31 0 1
Not merged 4890 0.05 0.23 0 1
Notes: The table depicts the summary statistics for all treatment group dummies and all covariates used. I define
variables as follows, Control, Uncertainty and Unequal Knowledge group realizations represent the respective allocations
of respondents to either group; household size comprises single households and household with 2, 3, 4 and 5+ members;
age categories are ≤28, 29-38, 39-48, 49-55 and ≥59; Married equals 1 if respondent is married, 0 otherwise; Female equals
1 if respondent is female, 0 otherwise; Full time equals 1 if respondent is full time employed, 0 otherwise; Retired equals
1 if respondent is retired, 0 otherwise; education categories comprise low (secondary schooling, no job training), low to
medium education (upper secondary schooling or finished job training), high to medium education (upper secondary
schooling and finished job training) and high eduction (tertiary education); household income variables define net monthly
household incomes on a 5-point scale from poor, i.e. 1 (≤1500 Euro), 2 (1500≥x<2500 Euro), 3 (2500≥x<3500 Euro), 4
(3500≥x<4500 Euro) to 5 being rich (≥4500 Euro) as well as a dummy for no answers (No income stated) and a dummy
for those observations which had not been in wave 37 of the GIP where the income question was asked; conservatives
equals 1 if >5 on a 11-scale left-right placement variable, for ≤5 left-wing equals 1. Non partisans did not report a score
for the left-right placement variable. I include a dummy for observations which had not been in the GIP wave where the
political preference question was asked. Data comes from the German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 40, except for political
preferences as well as household incomes (wave 37).
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Notes: Average tax morale by experimental group with 95% confidence bars. The outcome variable is the survey question
about tax morale preferences as described in Section 2.1. Treatment groups as described in Section 2.2. Total number
of observations is 4,809 with even distribution across experimental groups. Data come from GIP wave 40 (Blom et al.,
2015).
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Table 2: Effect of experimental intervention on tax morale, Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uncertainty -0.304∗ ∗ ∗ -0.300∗ ∗ ∗ -0.299∗ ∗ ∗ -0.300∗ ∗ ∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Unequal knowledge -0.246∗ ∗ ∗ -0.240∗ ∗ ∗ -0.242∗ ∗ ∗ -0.242∗ ∗ ∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Constant 5.080∗ ∗ ∗ 4.494∗ ∗ ∗ 4.420∗ ∗ ∗ 4.358∗ ∗ ∗
(0.026) (0.102) (0.109) (0.112)
test (p-val T1 vs. T2) 0.138 0.132 0.153 0.143
N 4809 4635 4635 4635
r2 0.015 0.037 0.039 0.043
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on tax morale preferences. This is
estimated by OLS regressions of tax morale preferences on treatment dummies. Tax morale is measured on a 6 point
scale based on the question, “How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes?”. Answer categories range from absolutely
justifiable (1) to absolutely not justifiable (6). The experimental groups are, Control group, Uncertainty and Unequal
Knowledge group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive
the following information, “There are frequent reports on tax evasion in the media.” Participants in the Uncertainty
group receive the following information, “Tax laws are often complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances.
Given these complexities of the tax system, many citizens are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly
in their tax declaration.” Participants in the Unequal Knowledge group receive the following information, “Tax laws
are often complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances. Given these complexities of the tax system,
many citizens are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly in their tax declaration. Citizens who know
tax laws well or use a tax attorney can possibly take advantage of the complexities of the tax law and reduce their tax
burden.” The line p-val T1 vs. T2 presents the p-values from t-tests which compare if the regression coefficient for the
Uncertainty group is different from the regression coefficient for the Unequal Knowledge group. Columns (1)-(4) differ
in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status,
retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus net household income, (4): (3) plus political preferences. The scale of the
outcome variable is 1 (absolutely justifiable) to 6 (absolutely not justifiable). Robust standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Anatomy of tax morale
(1) (2) (3)
Household size 0.015 0.005 0.005
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Age 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Married 0.079* 0.070* 0.076*
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Female 0.110*** 0.104*** 0.097***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Full time-employed -0.033 -0.050 -0.041
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Retired 0.058 0.061 0.061
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Education 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.062***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)








No income stated 0.275*** 0.288***
(0.105) (0.105)








Uncertainty -0.300*** -0.299*** -0.300***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Unequal knowledge -0.240*** -0.242*** -0.242***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Constant 4.494*** 4.420*** 4.358***
(0.102) (0.109) (0.112)
N 4635 4635 4635
r2 0.037 0.039 0.043
Notes: The table presents the determinants of tax morale from wave 40 of the GIP using OLS regressions of tax morale on various
covariates. Tax morale is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question, “How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes?”. Answer
categories range from absolutely justifiable (1) to absolutely not justifiable (6). Each column (1)-(3) presents the results of one regression
with different sets of covariates. All columns always include dummies for participation in either of the two treatment groups. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are defined as follows, Uncertainty and Unequal knowledge
realizations represent the respective allocations of respondents to either group; household size comprises single households and household
with 2, 3, 4 and 5+ members; age categories are ≤28, 29-38, 39-48, 49-55 and ≥59; Married equals 1 if respondent is married, 0 otherwise;
Female equals 1 if respondent is female, 0 otherwise; Full time equals 1 if respondent is full time employed, 0 otherwise; Retired equals 1
if respondent is retired, 0 otherwise; education categories comprise low (secondary schooling, no job training), low to medium education
(upper secondary schooling or finished job training), high to medium education (upper secondary schooling and finished job training) and
high eduction (tertiary education); household income variables define net monthly personal incomes on a 5-point scale from poor, i.e. 1
(≤1500 Euro), 2 (1500≥x<2500 Euro), 3 (2500≥x<3500 Euro), 4 (3500≥x<4500 Euro) to 5 being rich (≥4500 Euro) as well as a dummy
for no answers (No income stated) and a dummy for those observations which had not been in wave 37 of the GIP where the income
question was asked; conservatives equals 1 if >5 on a 11-scale left-right placement variable, for ≤5 left-wing equals 1. Non partisans did
not report a score for the left-right placement variable. I include a dummy for observations which had not been in the GIP wave where
the political preference question was asked. Data comes from the German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 40, except for political preferences
as well as household incomes (wave 37).
37
Table 4: Effect of treatments on the distribution of tax morale preferences, LPM models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Uncertainty 0.004 0.008 0.029∗ ∗ ∗ 0.078∗ ∗ ∗ 0.008 -0.126∗ ∗ ∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Unequal knowledge 0.003 0.019∗ ∗ ∗ 0.013 0.065∗ ∗ ∗ -0.019 -0.081∗ ∗ ∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant 0.045∗ ∗ ∗ 0.057∗ ∗ ∗ 0.165∗ ∗ ∗ 0.225∗ ∗ ∗ 0.243∗ ∗ ∗ 0.265∗ ∗ ∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.026) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044)
test (p-val T1 vs. T2) 0.835 0.068 0.091 0.403 0.112 0.007
N 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635
r2 0.008 0.008 0.024 0.013 0.012 0.019
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Preference Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on the distribution of tax morale
preferences. I estimate Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimations of tax morale preferences on treatment dummies.
Tax morale dummy variables are derived from a 6 point scale question, “How justifiable do you think it is to evade
taxes?” in wave 40 of the GIP. Columns (1)-(6) differ in their outcome variables, namely the response categories to
the tax morale question, in Column (1) the outcome equals 1 if the respondent answered that he/she finds tax evasion
absolutely justifiable, 0 otherwise; in Column (2), the outcome equals 1 if the respondent answered that he/she finds tax
evasion justifiable, 0 otherwise; in Column (3) the outcome equals 1 if the respondent answered that he/she finds tax
evasion somewhat justifiable, 0 otherwise; in Column (4) the outcome equals 1 if the respondent answered that he/she
finds tax evasion somewhat not justifiable, 0 otherwise; in Column (5) the outcome equals 1 if the respondent answered
that he/she finds tax evasion not justifiable, 0 otherwise and in Column (6) the outcome equals 1 if the respondent
answered that he/she finds tax evasion absolutely not justifiable, 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(6) all control for a full set of
covariates, including gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement status, and education,
net personal income and political preferences. The experimental groups are Control group, Uncertainty and Unequal
Knowledge group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive
the following information, “There are frequent reports on tax evasion in the media.” Participants in the Uncertainty
group receive the following information, “Tax laws are often complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances.
Given these complexities of the tax system, many citizens are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly
in their tax declaration.” Participants in the Unequal Knowledge group receive the following information, “Tax laws
are often complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances. Given these complexities of the tax system,
many citizens are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly in their tax declaration. Citizens who know
tax laws well or use a tax attorney can possibly take advantage of the complexities of the tax law and reduce their tax
burden.” The line p-val T1 vs. T2 presents the p-values from t-tests which compare if the regression coefficient for the
Uncertainty group is different from the regression coefficient for the Unequal Knowledge group. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity of average treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political orientation. Reference category: Conservative
Uncertainty × Left-wing -0.130 -0.126
(0.081) (0.082)
Uncertainty × Non partisans 0.071 0.027
(0.138) (0.136)
Uncertainty × Not merged 0.121 0.137
(0.177) (0.185)
Unequal knowledge × Left-wing -0.195∗∗ -0.210∗∗
(0.082) (0.082)
Unequal knowledge × Non-partisans -0.133 -0.236∗
(0.139) (0.136)
Unequal knowledge × Not merged 0.161 0.136
(0.185) (0.198)
Age. Reference category =< 28
Uncertainty × =< 38 -0.094 -0.120
(0.152) (0.153)
Uncertainty × =< 48 -0.211 -0.267 ∗
(0.153) (0.153)
Uncertainty × =< 58 -0.338∗∗ -0.338 ∗∗
(0.140) (0.141)
Uncertainty × > 58 -0.348∗ ∗ ∗ -0.354 ∗ ∗ ∗
(0.134) (0.135)
Unequal knowledge × =< 38 -0.065 -0.032
(0.160) (0.162)
Unequal knowledge × =< 48 -0.017 -0.022
(0.155) (0.155)
Unequal knowledge × =< 58 -0.081 -0.012
(0.143) (0.144)
Unequal knowledge × > 58 -0.125 -0.084
(0.137) (0.139)
N 4809 4635 4806 4635
r2 0.020 0.045 0.031 0.046
Full-set of controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table shows the heterogeneous effects of the experimental interventions. Reported are the coefficients and
standard errors (in parentheses) from a series of OLS regressions of the form yi = β1Treati+β2Covariatei+β3(Treati×
Covariatei) + εi. Where Covariatei is the respective covariate listed above. For the sake of brevity, only the interaction
Treati × Covariatei is reported. yi represents tax morale from wave 40 of the GIP and is measured on a 6 point scale
based on the question, “How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes?”. Answer categories range from absolutely
justifiable (1) to absolutely not justifiable (6). Treati represents treatment indicators for either the Uncertainty or the
Unequal Knowledge group, the control group is omitted. (Treati × Covariatei) is a full interaction of the treatment
indicators with the respective covariate. Specifications (1) to (4) represent heterogeneous effects for different covariates.
Column (1)-(2) reports interaction effects of both treatment indicators with measures of political orientation. Column
(3)-(4) reports interaction effects of both treatment indicators with age categories. Column (1) and (3) do not include
covariates while Column (2) and (4) include a full-set of covariates covering all demographic, income and political
preferences used in previous regressions. For the sake of brevity, no heterogeneous effects are listed for which I did not
find significant interaction effects (available upon request). Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Change in tax morale (wave 41 - wave 40)
Control Uncertainty
Unequal knowledge
Notes: The figure depicts the distribution in change of tax morale responses between the follow-up question in wave 41 and
the main experiment in wave 40 for control group respondents. Changes in tax morale are measured only for respondents
who answer the tax morale question in both survey waves. Total number of observations is 1,461. Data come from GIP
wave 40 and 41 (Blom et al., 2015).
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Table 6: Effect of experimental interventions on tax morale in follow-up survey
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uncertainty -0.014 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Unequal knowledge -0.086∗∗ -0.066 -0.066 -0.066
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Constant 5.107∗ ∗ ∗ 4.400∗ ∗ ∗ 4.403∗ ∗ ∗ 4.309∗ ∗ ∗
(0.030) (0.115) (0.117) (0.119)
test (p-val T1 vs. T2) 0.086 0.157 0.150 0.174
N 4405 4253 4253 4253
r2 0.001 0.040 0.041 0.048
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on tax morale preferences in the follow-up
wave 41 of the GIP. This is estimated by OLS regressions of tax morale preferences on treatment dummies. I restrict the
number of observations to respondents who underwent the experiment in wave 40. Tax morale is measured on a 6 point
scale based on the question, “How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes if a good opportunity to do so presents
itself?”. Answer categories range from absolutely justifiable (1) to absolutely not justifiable (6). The experimental
groups from wave 40 are: Control group, Uncertainty and Unequal Knowledge group. Control is omitted, implying that
the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive the following information: “There are frequent
reports on tax evasion in the media.” The line p-val T1 vs. T2 presents the p-values from t-tests which compare if the
regression coefficient for the Uncertainty group is different from the regression coefficient for the Unequal Knowledge
group. Columns (1)-(4) differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status,
household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus net personal income, (4): (3) plus
political preferences. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Change of tax morale answer categories in follow-up survey
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Uncertainty -0.000 0.001 -0.013 0.001 0.042∗∗ -0.031∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Unequal knowledge 0.009∗∗ -0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.052∗ ∗ ∗ -0.052∗ ∗ ∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
Constant 0.018 0.116∗ ∗ ∗ 0.164∗ ∗ ∗ 0.228∗ ∗ ∗ 0.188∗ ∗ ∗ 0.286∗ ∗ ∗
(0.013) (0.022) (0.025) (0.032) (0.043) (0.046)
test (p-val T1 vs. T2) 0.027 0.288 0.347 0.975 0.569 0.243
N 4253 4253 4253 4253 4253 4253
r2 0.009 0.019 0.021 0.008 0.009 0.030
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Preference Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on tax morale preference answer cate-
gories in the follow-up wave 41 of the GIP. This is estimated by OLS regressions of tax morale preferences on treatment
dummies. I restrict the number of observations to respondents who underwent the experiment in wave 40. I estimate
Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimations of tax morale preferences on treatment dummies. Tax morale dummy vari-
ables are derived from a 6 point scale question, “How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes if a good opportunity
to do so presents itself?” in wave 41 of the GIP. Columns (1)-(6) differ in their outcome variables, namely the response
categories to the tax morale question, in Column (1) the outcome equals 1 if the respondent answered that he/she
finds tax evasion absolutely justifiable, 0 otherwise; in Column (2), the outcome equals 1 if the respondent answered
that he/she finds tax evasion justifiable, 0 otherwise; in Column (3) the outcome equals 1 if the respondent answered
that he/she finds tax evasion somewhat justifiable, 0 otherwise; in Column (4) the outcome equals 1 if the respondent
answered that he/she finds tax evasion somewhat not justifiable, 0 otherwise; in Column (5) the outcome equals 1 if the
respondent answered that he/she finds tax evasion not justifiable, 0 otherwise and in Column (6) the outcome equals 1 if
the respondent answered that he/she finds tax evasion absolutely not justifiable, 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(6) all control
for a full set of covariates, including gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement status,
and education, net personal income and political preferences. The experimental groups are Control group, Uncertainty
and Unequal Knowledge group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All
participants receive the following information, “There are frequent reports on tax evasion in the media.” Participants
in the Uncertainty group receive the following information, “Tax laws are often complicated due to many possible de-
ductions and allowances. Given these complexities of the tax system, many citizens are often not sure, whether they
report all incomes correctly in their tax declaration.” Participants in the Unequal Knowledge group receive the following
information, “Tax laws are often complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances. Given these complexities
of the tax system, many citizens are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly in their tax declaration.
Citizens who know tax laws well or use a tax attorney can possibly take advantage of the complexities of the tax law and
reduce their tax burden.” The line p-val T1 vs. T2 presents the p-values from t-tests which compare if the regression
coefficient for the Uncertainty group is different from the regression coefficient for the Unequal Knowledge group. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Heterogeneous treatment effects in follow-up
(1) (2)
Political orientation. Reference category: Conservative
Uncertainty × Left-wing -0.120 -0.131
(0.090) (0.084)
Uncertainty × Non-partisans -0.033 -0.056
(0.156) (0.139)
Uncertainty × Not-merged 0.037 0.155
(0.203) (0.229)
Unequal knowledge × Left-wing -0.237∗ ∗ ∗ -0.213∗∗
(0.091) (0.085)
Unequal knowledge × Non-partisans -0.187 -0.276∗∗
(0.156) (0.139)




Full-set of controls No Yes
Notes: The table shows the heterogeneous effects of the experimental interventions in the follow-up
survey (wave 41 of the GIP). Reported are the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from
a series of OLS regressions of the form yi = β1 Treati + β2 Covariatei + β3 (Treati × Covariatei)
+ εi. Where Covariatei is the respective covariate listed above. For the sake of brevity, only the
interaction Treati × Covariatei is reported. yi represents tax morale from wave 41 of the GIP and
is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question, “How justifiable do you think it is to evade
taxes?”. Answer categories range from absolutely justifiable (1) to absolutely not justifiable (6).
Treati represents treatment indicators for either the Uncertainty or the Unequal Knowledge group,
the control group is omitted. (Treati × Covariatei) is a full interaction of the treatment indicators
with the respective covariate. Column (1) and (2) represent heterogeneous effects for political ideology.
No other heterogeneities were to be found for other covariates. Column (1) does not condition on
covariates while Column (2) includes a full-set of covariates covering all demographic, income and
political preferences used in previous regressions. For the sake of brevity, no heterogeneous effects are
listed for which I did not find signficant interaction effects (available upon request). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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6 Appendix
Figure A.1: Screenshot of the survey experiment: Control group
Notes: The figure depicts a screenshot of the tax morale question. Specifically, the picture shows the screen which
is shown to the control group participants. See Section 2 for a description of the survey and the randomized survey
experiment. Source: German Internet Panel (GIP), wave 40, including http://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/internet_
panel/Questionnaires/ and Blom et al. (2015).
Figure A.2: Screenshot of the survey experiment: Uncertainty group
Notes: The figure depicts a screenshot of the tax morale question. Specifically, the picture shows the screen which is
shown to the Uncertainty group participants. See Section 2 for a description of the survey and the randomized survey
experiment. Source: German Internet Panel (GIP), wave 40, including http://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/internet_
panel/Questionnaires/ and Blom et al. (2015).
44
Figure A.3: Screenshot of the survey experiment: Unequal knowledge group
Notes: Notes: The figure depicts a screenshot of the tax morale question. Specifically, the picture shows the screen which is
shown to the Unequal knowlege group participants. See Section 2 for a description of the survey and the randomized survey
experiment. Source: German Internet Panel (GIP), wave 40, including http://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/internet_
panel/Questionnaires/ and Blom et al. (2015).
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Table A.1: Balancing tests of experimental groups
Variable Control Uncertainty Unequal knowledge
Gender. Reference category Male
Sex -0.006 -0.002 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Marital status: Reference category: Not married
Married 0.015 -0.033** 0.022
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Full time employment: Reference category: Not full time employed
Unemployed -0.006 0.001 0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Retirement status: Reference category: Not retired
Retired 0.009 -0.001 0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Household size: Reference category Single households
2 0.020 -0.061*** 0.042**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
3 0.004 -0.025 0.016
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
4 0.026 -0.056 0.027
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
5+ 0.043 -0.054 -0.006
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Education: Reference category: Low Education
2 -0.024 0.005 0.026
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
3 -0.009 -0.022 0.039
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
high educ -0.009 0.000 0.014
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Household net income: Reference category poor
2 0.017 -0.053* 0.037
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
3 -0.004 -0.068** 0.079***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
4 0.005 -0.031 0.028
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
rich 0.021 -0.065** 0.042
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
6 0.010 -0.047 0.042
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
100 0.003 -0.055** 0.042
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age category: Reference category: < 34
34 − 49 -0.012 0.001 0.030
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
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> 49 0.019 0.003 -0.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Political orientation: Reference category: Conservatives
Left-wing -0.009 0.014 -0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
3 0.008 0.001 -0.009
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
100 -0.014 0.032 -0.061**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Notes: The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from a series of regressions
of the form yi = βCovariatei+εi. Where Covariatei is the respective covariate listed above. In Column
(1) yi equals 1 if participant i is in the control group and 0 otherwise. In Column (2),yi equals 1 if
participant i is in the Uncertainty group and 0 otherwise. In Column (3), yi equals 1 if participant i
is in the Unequal Knowledge group and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.2: Effect of experimental interventions on tax morale, LPM models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uncertainty -0.045∗ ∗ ∗ -0.044∗ ∗ ∗ -0.044∗ ∗ ∗ -0.044∗ ∗ ∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Unequal knowledge -0.039∗ ∗ ∗ -0.039∗ ∗ ∗ -0.039∗ ∗ ∗ -0.039∗ ∗ ∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 0.928∗ ∗ ∗ 0.770∗ ∗ ∗ 0.757∗ ∗ ∗ 0.742∗ ∗ ∗
(0.006) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
test (p-val T1 vs. T2) 0.578 0.620 0.669 0.632
N 4890 4710 4710 4710
r2 0.004 0.028 0.030 0.033
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on tax morale preferences. I estimate
Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimations of tax morale preferences on treatment dummies. Tax morale is coded as
1 if responses are 4,5 or 6 for the question, “How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes?” which is measured on
a 6 point scale, 0 otherwise. The experimental groups are Control group, Uncertainty and Unequal Knowledge group.
Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive the following
information, “There are frequent reports on tax evasion in the media.” Participants in the Uncertainty group receive
the following information, “Tax laws are often complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances. Given
these complexities of the tax system, many citizens are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly in their
tax declaration.” Participants in the Unequal Knowledge group receive the following information, “Tax laws are often
complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances. Given these complexities of the tax system, many citizens
are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly in their tax declaration. Citizens who know tax laws well or
use a tax attorney can possibly take advantage of the complexities of the tax law and reduce their tax burden.” The line
p-val T1 vs. T2 presents the p-values from t-tests which compare if the regression coefficient for the Uncertainty group
is different from the regression coefficient for the Unequal Knowledge group. Columns (1)-(4) differ in the included sets
of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement status,
and education, (3): (2) plus net personal income, (4): (3) plus political preferences. The scale of the outcome variable
is 1 (absolutely justifiable) to 6 (absolutely not justifiable). Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.3: Effect of experimental interventions on tax morale, Ordered Probit models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uncertainty -0.324∗ ∗ ∗ -0.325∗ ∗ ∗ -0.324∗ ∗ ∗ -0.327∗ ∗ ∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Unequal knowledge -0.252∗ ∗ ∗ -0.251∗ ∗ ∗ -0.253∗ ∗ ∗ -0.254∗ ∗ ∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
test (p-val T1 vs. T2) 0.057 0.054 0.063 0.057
N 4809 4635 4635 4635
Pseudo r2 0.006 0.013 0.014 0.015
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on tax morale preferences. I estimate
ordered probit regressions of tax morale preferences on treatment dummies. Tax morale is measured on a 6 point scale
based on the question: “How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes?”. Answer categories range from 1 (absolutely
justifiable) to 6 (absolutely not justifiable). The experimental groups are: Control group, Uncertainty and Unequal
Knowledge group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive
the following information: “There are frequent reports on tax evasion in the media.” Participants in the Uncertainty
group receive the following information: “Tax laws are often complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances.
Given these complexities of the tax system, many citizens are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly
in their tax declaration.” Participants in the Unequal Knowledge group receive the following information: “Tax laws
are often complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances. Given these complexities of the tax system,
many citizens are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly in their tax declaration. Citizens who know
tax laws well or use a tax attorney can possibly take advantage of the complexities of the tax law and reduce their tax
burden.” The line p-val T1 vs. T2 presents the p-values from t-tests which compare if the regression coefficient for the
Uncertainty group is different from the regression coefficient for the Unequal Knowledge group. Columns (1)-(4) differ
in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status,
retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus net personal income, (4): (3) plus political preferences. The scale of the
outcome variable is 1 (absolutely justifiable) to 6 (absolutely not justifiable). Robust standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.4: Keeping the numbers of observations constant, Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uncertainty -0.309∗ ∗ ∗ -0.300∗ ∗ ∗ -0.299∗ ∗ ∗ -0.300∗ ∗ ∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Unequal knowledge -0.246∗ ∗ ∗ -0.240∗ ∗ ∗ -0.242∗ ∗ ∗ -0.242∗ ∗ ∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Constant 5.086∗ ∗ ∗ 4.494∗ ∗ ∗ 4.420∗ ∗ ∗ 4.358∗ ∗ ∗
(0.026) (0.102) (0.109) (0.112)
test (p-val T1 vs. T2) 0.117 0.132 0.153 0.143
N 4635 4635 4635 4635
r2 0.015 0.037 0.039 0.043
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on tax morale preferences while keeping
the number of observations through specifications (1) to (4) constant. I fix the number of observations at the level of
the full-set of covariates of model (4). I estimate the models by OLS regressions of tax morale preferences on treatment
dummies. Tax morale is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question: “How justifiable do you think it is to
evade taxes?”. Answer categories range from absolutely justifiable (1) to absolutely not justifiable (6). The experimental
groups are: Control group, Uncertainty and Unequal Knowledge group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects
are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive the following information: “There are frequent reports on
tax evasion in the media.” Participants in the Uncertainty group receive the following information: “Tax laws are often
complicated due to many possible deductions and allowances. Given these complexities of the tax system, many citizens
are often not sure, whether they report all incomes correctly in their tax declaration.” Participants in the Unequal
Knowledge group receive the following information: “Tax laws are often complicated due to many possible deductions
and allowances. Given these complexities of the tax system, many citizens are often not sure, whether they report all
incomes correctly in their tax declaration. Citizens who know tax laws well or use a tax attorney can possibly take
advantage of the complexities of the tax law and reduce their tax burden.” The line p-val T1 vs. T2 presents the
p-values from t-tests which compare if the regression coefficient for the Uncertainty group is different from the regression
coefficient for the Unequal Knowledge group. Columns (1)-(4) differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates,
(2): gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus net
household income, (4): (3) plus political preferences. The scale of the outcome variable is 1 (absolutely justifiable) to 6
(absolutely not justifiable). Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Control Uncertainty
Unequal knowledge
Notes: Tax morale response categories by experimental group. The outcome variable is the survey question about tax
morale preferences as described in Section 2.1. Tax morale is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question: “How
justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes?” Treatment groups as described in Section 2.2. Total number of observations
is 4,809 with even distribution across experimental groups. Data come from GIP wave 40 (Blom et al., 2015).
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Table A.5: Testing selective attrition to follow-up survey
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uncertainty -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Unequal knowledge -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.994∗ ∗ ∗ 0.990∗ ∗ ∗ 0.990∗ ∗ ∗ 0.992∗ ∗ ∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
test (p-val T1 vs T2) 0.706 0.725 0.700 0.691
N 4438 4283 4283 4283
r2 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.006
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on the likelihood to
answer the follow-up question in wave 41 of the GIP. This is estimated by OLS regressions of an indica-
tor variable which equals 1 if the respondent has answered that question on treatment dummies and is
zero otherwise. I restrict the number of observations to respondents who underwent the experiment in
wave 40. 4,405 of these respondents answered the tax morale question in wave 41 and 33 did not. The
experimental groups from wave 40 are: Control group, Uncertainty and Unequal Knowledge group.
Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive
the following information: “There are frequent reports on tax evasion in the media.” The line p-val T1
vs. T2 presents the p-values from t-tests which compare if the regression coefficient for the Uncertainty
group is different from the regression coefficient for the Unequal Knowledge group. Columns (1)-(4)
differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status, household
size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus net personal income, (4): (3)
plus political preferences. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.6: Balancing tests of experimental groups in follow-up
Variable Control Uncertainty Unequal knowledge
Gender. Reference category Male
Sex 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Marital status: Reference category: Not married
Married 0.019 -0.035** 0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Full time employment: Reference category: Not full time employed
Full-time employed -0.003 -0.003 0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Retirement status: Reference category: Not retired
Retired 0.005 -0.001 -0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Household size: Reference category Single households
2 0.023 -0.062*** 0.038*
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
3 0.016 -0.032 0.016
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
4 0.026 -0.057 0.031
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
5+ 0.073** -0.069 -0.004
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Education: Reference category: Low Education
2 -0.026 0.002 0.024
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
3 0.000 -0.039 0.039
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
high educ -0.012 0.001 0.011
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
Household net income: Reference category poor
2 0.007 0.005 -0.011
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
3 -0.016 0.019 -0.003
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
4 -0.001 0.016 -0.015
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
rich 0.052 -0.005 -0.048
(0.036) (0.035) (0.034)
6 0.020 -0.005 -0.048
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
100 0.004 0.027 -0.048
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Age category: Reference category: < 34
34 − 49 -0.018 -0.000 0.018
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
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> 49 0.019 -0.005 -0.014
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Political orientation: Reference category: Conservatives
Left-wing -0.009 0.015 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
3 0.009 0.006 -0.005
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
100 -0.002 0.027 -0.025
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
Notes: The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from a series of regressions
of the form: yi = βCovariatei + εi. Where Covariatei is the respective covariate listed above. In
Column (1) yi equals 1 if participant i is in the control group and 0 otherwise. In Column (2),yi equals
1 if participant i is in the Uncertainty group and 0 otherwise. In Column (3), yi equals 1 if participant
i is in the Unequal Knowledge group and 0 otherwise. The table is based on 4,405 respondents who
answered the tax morale question in wave 41 and underwent the experiment in wave 40. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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